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1.  Introduction 
Growth economics has never been far from the centre of economists’ attention 
since Adam Smith’s inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations more 
than two centuries ago. But following a period in which research in this field was 
confined mainly to development economists and economic historians, there has been a 
revival of interest among theorists and macro-economists. Endogenous growth theory 
has flourished since the contributions of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) drew 
attention to previously neglected sources of growth, such as those arising from the 
presence of increasing returns, highlighting in turn the possible role of agglomeration 
economies, R&D, or social infrastructure. At the same time, cross-country empirical 
analysis of post-war growth, covering both developed and developing economies, has 
become a small growth industry.
2  Numerous  correlates of the rate of growth in 
income per capita not previously incorporated into formal growth models have been 
identified in cross-country regressions, including measures of the legal system, 
democracy, climate, language, religion, openness, corruption, latitude, access to 
navigable water, natural resources, a colonial past, and more. Exactly how these 
correlates interact, and which are truly exogenous to the growth process, are issues of 
continuing debate.  
Assessing the implications of this literature for the analysis of Australian 
growth over the long run is one motivation for this survey. Another is to review those 
recent contributions that have significantly enhanced our understanding of the 
development of the Australian economy, including contributions in which Australian 
experience is explored in a comparative context. Of course, much research in 
economic history relates, directly or indirectly, to long-run growth. And, running in 
                                                   
1  The helpful comments of Peter Kenyon, Richard Pomfret, and three referees are gratefully 
acknowledged. Choon Wang contributed excellent research assistance. 
2  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and Temple (2000) review the growth literature. See also the 
companion survey to this article by Rogers (2003).  
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the other direction, some of the most exciting recent work in growth economics has an 
historical dimension. Indeed, a striking attribute of the current growth literature is a 
blurring of the boundaries between economic history and other fields – especially 
development economics and macroeconomics. What this survey does not attempt, 
however, is a review of recent writings on all aspects of Australian economic history.
3  
To provide some context to what follows, I begin by examining key measures 
of Australian growth over the last two centuries and noting the major interpretations 
offered by earlier generations of economists and historians. I then review the 
significance and implications of the principal revisions and extensions made to some 
key historical series during the last decade or so. A survey of recent contributions to 
the explanation of this growth record then follows, beginning with those focusing on 
the proximate sources of growth, and on the role of selected economic policies. 
Attention then shifts to so-called deeper determinants, including geographical, 
institutional and cultural influences. Although these influences have only recently 
been incorporated into growth models and empirical growth analysis (particularly into 
cross-country growth regressions), many figure prominently in Australian 
historiography. Thus a fresh assessment of their relevance seems warranted.  
 
2.  Indicators of Long-Run Growth 
A selection of growth performance indicators is reported in Table 1.
4 In Panel 
A the sub-periods are defined to reflect those phases of faster or slower growth 
conventionally identified in the literature. The depressions of the early 1840s, 1890s 
and 1930s are mirrored in the poor per capita growth in those decades, while the 
contrasting economic impacts of the two world wars is strikingly evident. The 
succession of natural resource-based and export-oriented expansions lies behind the 
figures relating to the 1820s and 1830s (wool), the 1850s (gold), the three decades 
before 1890 (gold, agriculture), the decade before the first world war (agriculture), 
and the long post-war boom (initially agriculture, later minerals). The impressive 
performance of the economy in the last half of the twentieth century compares 
favourably (in per capita terms) with that recorded for the long boom between 1850 
                                                   
3  Even the discussion of growth issues does not purport to be comprehensive. And more space will be 
accorded twentieth than nineteenth century experience. Note that there has been no survey of the 
economic historiography of Australia since that by Schedvin (1979). 
4  These indicators are based on the GDP estimates most widely employed; criticism of them will be 
considered below.  
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and 1890. And notable about the most recent period is that the population growth rate 
is the lowest of any peacetime period other than that recorded during the depression of 
the 1930s.
5  
International comparisons of Australia’s growth performance can also be 
given an historical perspective, and in Panel B of Table 1 the level of per capita GDP 
at benchmark dates, relative to that of the United States, is shown for Australia and a 
number of other countries selected because of their close links with Australia (the 
United Kingdom) or the many similarities in their initial growth conditions (Canada, 
New Zealand and Argentina). The early attainment of relatively high living standards 
by Australians is well known, possibly the highest in the world from 1850 to 1890. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century Britain, the U.S. and New Zealand all closed 
the gap with Australia. The data also suggest that, relative to either Britain or the U.S., 
there has been no secular drift in Australian GDP per capita since the 1920s – the 
1950, 1973 and 1994 ratios being close to those in 1929. By contrast, Canada in the 
post-war era appears to have done (slightly) better than Australia by this performance 
criterion, while over the last quarter century New Zealand has slipped.
6  
Before reviewing the literature that explains this and related evidence, an 
important distinction is in order about what, in the Australian context, is meant by 
economic growth. In the evaluation of Australian growth performance, both the 
intensive and extensive dimensions warrant attention. Growth theory identifies key 
determinants of rates of change in output per capita (or in some related variable such 
as real income per person or output per unit of labour input), while cross-country 
growth regressions typically use one of these as the dependent variable. Thus growth 
theory and applied growth analysis both focus on the intensive dimension of growth. 
However, for much of Australia’s history a more important social objective was 
extensive growth – the size of the economy – though this was pursued subject to the 
maintenance (at least) of real wages or living standards. And before as well as after 
the invention of national accounts, the most visible and best-understood measure of 
size was total population. In recent decades the consensus behind this policy objective 
has frayed, as reflected both in the current debate about the desirable total population 
                                                   
5  Care should be taken in pressing these inter-period comparisons too far. The sources and methods of 
compilation of the underlying GDP estimates vary, and their quality and reliability are best for the post-
war decades and least satisfactory for the pre-1861 period.    
6  The underlying estimates should be treated with caution. In particular, they may be sensitive to the 
method of conversion  (using exchange rates or purchasing power parity) to a common unit, especially 
for the nineteenth century: see Prados de la Escosura (2000).  
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and in the decline in actual rates of population increase. But until the 1970s there is 
little doubt as to the policy importance of economic expansion in this aggregate 
sense.
7   
 
3.  Earlier Interpretations  
Given the initial conditions of European settlement after 1788, it is 
unsurprising that one interpretation of Australian development would emphasise the 
key role of the state. The British government heavily subsidised the colony in its early 
decades (Butlin 1994). And for many years the prominence of the convicts in the 
population and labour force gave to the economy the flavour of a state enterprise. 
Although the ‘private’ sector emerged quickly, state influence in economic activity 
remained pervasive. In this view, the settling of the continent by government-assisted 
development of rural and urban infrastructure, schemes of assisted immigration, and 
public sector borrowing abroad, all underpinned the economic success story down to 
1890.
8    
An alternative view stressed the risk-taking and innovative characteristics of 
the individuals and firms that built the economy both in its pioneering days and in 
subsequent decades. The mining, pastoral and agricultural industries flourished and 
became world competitive under conditions of great uncertainty and limited 
information, underpinning the growth of commercial and industrial enterprises and 
raising living standards, because domestic and global market incentives encouraged 
effort and entrepreneurship and rewarded saving and investment.
9   
Common to both these views is their treatment of the Australian experience in 
relative isolation. By contrast, a more international perspective is the starting point for 
other views. On one side is the interpretation that emphasised Australia’s colonial 
origins, and its position in the economic arrangements of empire (Fitzpatrick 1939, 
1941). Attention was drawn to the manifold links with British industrialisation. But 
analysis of these links was conducted on the assumption that colonial development 
was distorted as a result of the political and economic relationship with Britain. 
Another interpretation also placed domestic development in a wider perspective, but 
not in the straitjacket of economic imperialism. The cornerstone was the observation 
                                                   
7  In this view, the rates of population growth reported in Table 1, Panel A, are important indicators of 
economic performance.  
8  The most important early writer in this tradition was Coghlan (1918). See also Butlin (1959). 
9  A classic statement is that of Shann (1930); a recent contribution is by White (1992).   
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that the Australian economy in the nineteenth century was very much created by, and 
formed an integral part of, an emerging international economy. Some writers in this 
tradition emphasised the importance of export industries to domestic growth.
10 Others 
looked at the interactions between domestic and foreign markets for capital and 
labour, or at the transmission of economic shocks.
11 Indeed, Australia has always 
been highly integrated with the world economy, and its place in the imperial economy 
was an important component of this until well into the twentieth century.
12 And 
although the export-led growth hypothesis has limitations, studies in this vein were a 
healthy antidote to the tendency among some writers to focus on domestic conditions 
in relative isolation.  
Particularly influential in the 1960s and 1970s was the focus by Noel Butlin 
(1964) on the role of investment in accounting for growth and macroeconomic 
fluctuations, especially in the late-nineteenth century economy. However, his 
narrative was not articulated in a growth-analytic framework. The links with labour 
force growth (especially with immigration) were not made, hence there was no 
attribution of growth sources between factor accumulation and total factor 
productivity, or discussion of technology (as occurred in the export-led growth 
literature, which had the aggregate production function as its organising framework). 
Nor was there an integration of foreign and domestic investment activity within a 
small open economy macro model, as was offered, for example, in the work of Hall 
(1963b) and Boehm (1971). What did get emphasis in Butlin’s account was the 
importance of the public sector’s contribution to both financing and allocating capital 
expenditure. To this extent there is a link between his work and the earlier tradition 
stressing the role of the state in the growth story. 
 
4.  Re-assessing the Growth Record  
Assessments of the performance of the economy over the long run are heavily 
dependent on the availability and quality of key statistical series such as national 
accounts aggregates, and Australia is relatively well supplied with these, due 
especially to the efforts between the 1950s and 1980s of a research group at the ANU 
led by Noel Butlin. If in recent years the generation of significant new economic 
                                                   
10  The best contribution is by Lougheed (1968); see also Schedvin (1990). 
11  Most notably Boehm (1971), Hall (1963b), and Kelley (1965, 1968). 
12  The undergraduate economic history text by Meredith and Dyster (1999) conveys this theme in its 
design as well as its title. See also McLean (1989).  
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series relating to Australia’s past has slowed markedly, there have nonetheless been 
important debates about the quality and interpretation of the statistical foundations of 
our knowledge of the economy’s past growth performance.
13 
Revisions to conventional GDP estimates.  Criticisms, extensions, and 
revisions of the historical estimates of gross domestic product for 1861 to 1938-39 
compiled by Noel Butlin (1962) began soon after their appearance. The major 
revisions to and extensions of these estimates are those by Matthew Butlin (1977) 
covering 1900-01 to 1973-74; those by Noel Butlin and Sinclair (1986) for the early 
colonial period; and also the estimates of Sinclair (1996) for the colony/state of 
Victoria for the period 1861 to 1976-77. Broadly, each of these employed the 
estimation methods adopted in Noel Butlin’s original work, constructing annual 
current-price estimates of GDP by the production (rather than the income) method, 
then deflating the sectoral components by appropriate price indexes to obtain constant 
price estimates. Collectively these remain the only comprehensive historical estimates 
of GDP (and its principal components), and hence are those used in international 
comparisons of Australian long-run growth performance. 
An attempt to provide an alternative to the Butlin-based series of GDP 
estimates has recently been made by Haig (2001). His approach is to retain the 
production method, but to proceed directly to constant price estimates. This is done by 
computing quantity indexes of production by sector for each year, then aggregating 
with sectoral weights derived using unit prices in the base year only.
14 Over the entire 
1861 to 1938-39 period, the differences in trend growth rates between the new and the 
original series are not great: the growth in per capita real GDP averages 0.49 percent 
per annum using Butlin’s (1962) estimates and 0.57 percent using Haig’s estimates, 
and between 1890 and 1938-39 the respective annual growth rates are 0.46 and 0.52 
percent. However, during the long boom following the gold rushes (1861 to 1890), 
Butlin’s estimates show an annual per capita growth rate of 1.46 percent, but Haig’s 
new estimates reduce this by almost two-thirds, to 0.54 percent. A corollary of this 
more modest GDP growth before 1890 is that the subsequent depression is less severe 
                                                   
13  A major compilation of statistics on the history of the economy is available in Vamplew (1987). See 
also the analyses of key macro time series by Greasley and Oxley (1997, 1998). 
14  Actually, two base years are used: 1891 prices for the period 1861 to 1911; and 1938-39 prices for 
the period 1910-11 to 1948-49. Estimates for both Victoria and New South Wales for 1861-1911 are 
separately reported.    
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than that reflected in Butlin’s estimates.
15 If Haig’s new series are eventually accepted 
as being the more credible, there will have to be a re-interpretation of some important 
episodes in Australia’s late nineteenth-century economic history.  
Note should also be made here of the estimates by Cashin (1995a) of GDP in 
all colonies/states and in New Zealand for 15 (mainly census) years between 1861 and 
1991. His estimation method for the Australian states prior to 1971 relied on monetary 
data, and an assumption that the income velocity of money derived for Australia as a 
whole could be applied to the individual states’ money series to obtain an estimate of 
their aggregate incomes. His primary aim was to obtain GDP estimates for individual 
states, not provide an alternative set of estimates for Australia.
16  
Living standards.  One of the most widely remarked features of the 
Australian growth story is that, from having the highest per capita income in the 
world in the late nineteenth century, a relative decline in living standards has since 
occurred. It is thus unsurprising that this topic has continued to attract attention. 
A number of studies have examined Australia’s relative position in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Some use GDP data to make international comparisons 
of per capita income – the most widely cited being those by Maddison (1995) used 
above in Table 1, Panel B. For Australia, these rely heavily on Noel Butlin’s 
estimates, and show that per capita GDP was clearly above Britain and the United 
States between 1850 and 1890, but that both had caught up by the first world war. In a 
recent evaluation of international comparisons of this type, Prados de la Escosura 
(2000) employs alternative methods of converting the national income figures for 
each country for benchmark years. A conversion using exchange rates ranks Australia 
as having either the highest GDP per capita or, in some years, the second highest 
(after New Zealand) from 1820 to 1890, the third highest in 1900 (though little 
separates it from the U.S. or New Zealand)), and the highest again in 1913. A third 
conversion method, preferred by Prados de la Escosura, still ranks Australia first from 
1820 to 1890, but the margin over the United States is greatly reduced relative to that 
                                                   
15  There are also significant differences between the two sets of GDP estimates for shorter intervals 
during the twentieth century.  
16  However, summing his regional estimates produces Australian GDP levels in key early years (such 
as 1861, 1891, and 1910-11) that differ little from the Butlin’s estimates. This may be due to the 
reliance placed on Butlin’s work in the estimation of components of GDP in the individual states.  
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reported by Maddison (1995) and shown in Table 1, and in most years there is little 
difference between the two.
17    
An alternative approach to the assessment of comparative standards of living 
at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth has been attempted 
by Allen (1994) using nominal wage data for skilled and unskilled labour in selected 
cities in Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States between 1879 and 1913. He 
constructs a consumer price index that permits direct comparisons across these cities 
and through time. He finds that in the 1880s the real wages of unskilled labourers in 
Sydney, and the average real earnings of NSW manufacturing workers, were both 
significantly above their counterparts elsewhere, but that this margin was lost during 
the 1890s. For skilled labour, at the beginning of the 1880s, bricklayers in Sydney had 
real wages well above those in Manchester, but the real wages of those in Chicago 
and San Francisco were comparable to the Sydney bricklayers. By the 1900s the wage 
gap between Sydney and Manchester had been narrowed, while American real wages 
moved above those in Sydney. Toronto and Vancouver bricklayers, too, were at that 
time receiving higher real wages than their Sydney counterparts. Thus until the 1890s 
general and unskilled labourers may have had higher real wages than their 
counterparts in the United States, but this may never have been true of Australian 
skilled workers. 
Allen’s real wage comparison is important because it permits some insight 
into possible differences in the distribution of incomes (or margins for skill) between 
Australia and other countries with which the standard of living comparisons are most 
frequently made. Also, it offers an independent test of the international comparisons 
based on GDP estimates. The results are broadly consistent: Australian living 
standards indeed seem to have been higher than those in Britain or the United States 
for several decades prior to 1890, but this lead was lost by 1900 or 1914.
18  
The related question of what happened to Australian living standards in the 
half-century after 1890 has also attracted recent scholarly attention. The GDP-based 
                                                   
17  See also the detailed comparisons of income per capita in New South Wales and in Britain for 1891 
reported in Thomas (1995) and in Haig (1989 and 2001, pp.22-25). Another method of comparison is 
the human development index. The historical HDI estimates of Crafts (2002, p.396) show Australia 
number one in 1870 and number two in 1913. 
18  A more appropriate comparison of incomes might be between Australia and some state or region 
within the United States. Considering its similarities with Australia in the timing of European 
settlement and initial resource endowments, California is a possible comparator. And in 1880, for 
example, income per capita in California was much further above the U.S. average than (in the 
international comparisons) was Australian income per capita (McLean and Taylor, 2003).   
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measures suggest that, despite short periods of growth, these were nearly offset by 
periods of decline such that, over 50 years, real income per capita rose only 14 
percent. Is Australian long-run per capita growth really a three-act drama, with two 
long periods of rising living standards before 1890 and after 1940, separated by a 
half-century of no trend improvement? 
McLean and Pincus (1983) pointed out that between 1890 and 1940 a wide 
range of partial measure of living standards or social indicators (such as housing 
quality, telephone ownership, and educational attainment), show much stronger 
improvement than the GDP-based measures. They also noted that the growth rates in 
real consumption per capita were above those of real GDP per capita. And they 
pointed to the major improvement in life expectancy that occurred during this time. 
They were aware, of course, that observing the fairly consistent growth in these 
indicators does not of itself establish that the GDP-based measures understate the true 
growth in GDP. And to establish whether there was something unusual in the 
relationship between the conventional and unconventional measures of living 
standards during this 50-year period required a similar exercise to be performed on 
evidence for the periods before 1890 and after 1940, an exercise they did not attempt. 
In the ensuing debate, an important contribution by Carter and Maddock 
(1987) was to examine the changes in work and leisure hours between 1911 and 1981, 
and to suggest that the increase in the latter may have been one way in which 
Australians took out their rising wellbeing. Between 1911 and 1947 a measure of ‘full 
income’ that included leisure grew at more than twice the rate of GDP per capita. 
However, after 1948, the GDP-based measure generally overstates the gains in 
wellbeing if account is also taken of changes in leisure.
19 
Also relevant for the discussion of trends in living standards is the work by 
Snooks (1994) to augment the historical national income estimates by taking account 
of non-marketed (household) economic activity. He constructs an annual measure of 
‘gross community income’ from 1861 to 1990 which is, of course, much greater than 
gross domestic product. This can then be divided either by the population or the 
number of households, the former being appropriate in a comparison with 
conventional measures of income. In the present context it is interesting to note that 
whereas the growth rates of GDP per capita and ‘gross community income’ per capita 
                                                   
19  A survey of this debate is provided in Jackson (1992).   
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do not greatly differ over the entire period 1861-1990 (being 1.39 and 1.33 percent 
per annum respectively), over the period of alleged stagnation in living standards, the 
conventional GDP-based measure is lower than the alternative (0.11 and 0.33 percent 
per annum respectively, 1889 to 1939).
20  
Anthropometric history.  Related to the discussions of living standards and 
alternative measures of economic wellbeing, imaginative use has recently been made 
of a range of historical data not normally thought of as part of the economists’ toolkit. 
Taking their cue from an earlier American literature, several scholars have analysed 
time series of height, weight, and body-mass index estimates for Australia.
21 Key 
assumptions are that, over at least some ranges of incomes, there exist reasonably 
stable relationships between these physiological indicators and nutrition, and also that 
the latter is likely to reflect in turn basic economic conditions. The motivation for 
these studies was wider than the issue of a half-century stagnation in living standards 
discussed above, and they are of interest more generally. But where they cover the 
1890-1940 period, independent evidence of what was happening to economic and 
social conditions is provided. The most recent survey and assessment is that by 
Whitwell and Nicholas (2001), who use data on male army recruits during the two 
world wars. They conclude that there is a rise in heights, but the body mass index 
series are less strongly supportive of the case for a rise in living standards over the 
half-century to 1940. 
Convergence.  In the immediate post-war decades Australian growth rates 
were below the OECD average. However, in the context of a model of conditional 
convergence, Dowrick and Nguyen (1988) showed that there was nothing surprising 
about the Australian growth rate given its immediate post-war level – well above that 
of many war-devastated economies.  
Nonetheless, there remains an unresolved issue for those who wish to view 
Australia’s long-run comparative growth in a convergence framework. Since 
Australia’s initial (mid- and late-nineteenth century) level of income exceeded that of 
all candidate reference countries, is the period between the 1890s and 1930s to be 
interpreted as one in which there occurred (beta-) convergence, but from above? If so, 
was there ‘over-shooting’? (If not, what growth model is relevant?) Moreover, in the 
70 years since the 1930s why has there been no convergence from below? Oxley and 
                                                   
20  These data are reported in Snooks (1994), Table 2.1, p.24.  
21   See Whitwell, de Souza and Nicholas (1997) and references cited there.   
  11 
Greasley (1995) have confirmed that, during the postwar period, Australian GDP per 
capita showed no tendency to fall further relative to that of either the U.K. or the U.S., 
but likewise no tendency to converge. Is the persistent gap in income or productivity 
(of at least 20 percent) measurement error, or simply too small to observe 
convergence forces at work? Or is this lack of evidence of economy-wide 
convergence concealing quite different levels of (and rates of growth in) productivity 
across the main sectors in the Australian economy, relative to their counterparts in 
(for example) the U.S.? If so, the speed of structural adjustment becomes part of the 
explanation for the aggregate economy’s relative performance.
22   
Historical analysis of convergence among the seven colonies of Australasia 
(and their successor states) was also the motivation behind the regional estimates of 
Cashin (1995a) previously described. He finds (Cashin 1995b) that there was (both 
beta- and sigma-) convergence among the seven regions between 1861 and 1991. 
Within this, he finds brief periods of divergence (during 1901-11 and 1947-51), and 
also that most of the reduction in the dispersion of regional incomes occurred by 
1891.  
 
5.  The Sources of Growth Framework 
Turning from questions relating to the measurement of Australia’s growth 
record to the explanation of that record, one entry point is to distinguish between 
proximate determinants of long-run growth (physical and human capital 
accumulation, productivity improvement, the exploitation of scale economies), the 
contribution of growth-enhancing or growth-inhibiting policies, and the role of deeper 
determinants (such as institutional arrangements, geographic features, and cultural or 
social norms).  
Factor accumulation.  Noel Butlin’s (1964) narrative of late-nineteenth 
century development focused on investment partly because of the central role of 
capital accumulation (and the saving that financed it) in the growth models of the 
1940s and 1950s. There has been little further historical research in this tradition, 
perhaps reflecting the subsequent trend away from so restricted a perspective in both 
theoretical and empirical studies of growth. However, recent studies of the evolution 
                                                   
22  These speculations are prompted in part by the findings of Broadberry (1998) with respect to 
sectoral productivity levels and (national) convergence trends in Britain, Germany and the U.S. 
between 1870 and 1990.   
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of the capital market have improved understanding of the institutional context within 
which investment was financed.
23  And two studies have examined the determinants 
of long-term changes in the aggregate saving rate in the light of the  life-cycle and 
permanent income hypotheses, immigration flows, and demographic influences, 
placing the Australian experience in the context of saving behaviour in Argentina, 
Canada and the United States.
24  
The effect on growth of fluctuations in the expansion of the labour force was 
investigated in the 1960s in several analytical studies of economic-demographic 
interactions and of the economic effects of immigration (Hall 1963a; Kelley 1965, 
1968). Again, the focus was on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and 
in particular on the very long run consequences of the demographic shock associated 
with the gold rushes. The unusual age and sex ratios, and also workforce participation 
rates, associated with that event played a significant role in the economy’s growth.
25 
Subsequently there has occurred a broadening of this canvas. Both the economic 
determinants of immigration, and its effects on the economy, have been analysed in 
several studies, most notably in the work of Pope and Withers (1993, 1994) and 
Taylor (1994). And other historical features of the labour market of relevance to 
growth, especially human capital accumulation, have also received some attention.
26   
Among these is one feature of Australian growth that is striking when viewed 
in comparative perspective – the much later rise in high school participation rates 
during the twentieth century than occurred in the United States. MacKinnon (1989) 
has shown how Australia (and Britain) lagged the U.S. by several decades in this 
crucial determinant of productivity performance. The fact that most other advanced 
economies similarly lagged American educational attainments only increases the need 
for a clearer understanding than currently is available of the contribution of schooling 
to Australia’s long-run comparative growth performance. 
Technological change.  The diverse historical literature on innovation and 
technological change in Australian manufacturing, agriculture, and other sectors 
directs attention beyond factor accumulation and towards productivity improvement 
as a source of Australian growth. Yet the work of Kaspura and Weldon (1980) 
                                                   
23  This is surveyed by Merrett (1997). See also the comprehensive overview by Davis and Gallman 
(2001), Chapter 5. 
24  See McLean (1994) and Taylor and Williamson (1994).  
25  An early effort at formal modelling was made by Withers (1977).  
26  Several contributions in Pope and Alston (1989) represent this literature.   
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relating to productivity growth since 1900 supports the view that Australia seems to 
have stayed in the factor accumulation phase longer than, for example, the U.S. where 
the transition to growth based on increasing total factor productivity occurred in the 
early decades of the twentieth century. By contrast, in most decades to the 1960s 
growth in total factor input accounted for about two-thirds of Australian output 
growth.   
Since the 1960s, Australia has experienced a temporal pattern similar to that of 
most OECD countries: a slowdown in productivity growth in the 1970s and 1980s 
followed by a recovery in the 1990s.  The explanation for the more favourable recent 
trends remains open to debate (Dowrick 2001). From an historical perspective an 
important question is whether the current productivity surge marks a decisive break 
with the past in that increases in labour productivity (and per capita income) are no 
longer so dependent on increases in capital intensity or on natural resource extraction. 
If so, the transition from the dominant sources of nineteenth century growth will be 
identified as having occurred only at the end of the twentieth century.  
Scale economies.  A potential source of growth that has not received much 
formal attention relates to the size of the domestic economy. The rise of wool exports 
in the 1820s demonstrated a capacity to achieve scale economies (at the level of the 
firm or industry), despite a very small home market, by specialisation of production 
for sale into world markets. Further examples were to follow. Of course, if 
establishing a domestic base prior to entering export markets is important, the size of 
the domestic market may still matter.
27  
A related consideration is the initial fragmentation of the domestic economy. 
Blainey (1966), among others, has stressed the importance to growth of the gradual 
integration of regional markets separated by considerable distances and high transport 
costs. Heavy investment in social infrastructure, beginning in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, lowered communication and transport costs between these 
regional economies. Colonial labour and capital markets seem to have become 
remarkably well integrated. And federation assisted in removing barriers to inter-
regional trade. Support for these generalisations may be found in the evidence of 
regional income convergence reported by Cashin (1995b). Nonetheless, the dispersion 
                                                   
27  The importance assigned to the size of the United States domestic market in explanations of that 
economy’s growth is a reminder of the possible constraint on Australian growth from the same source.  
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of the population around thousands of kilometres of coastline remains a striking 
characteristic of this economy.  
Offsetting this, however, and evident from the nineteenth century, is the 
tendency for this scattered population to concentrate in a few large urban areas. If 
economic density and agglomeration economies matter to the efficiency of firms or 
industries (as stressed in some endogenous growth models), growth would be 
enhanced as the Australian economy shifted to a more urban orientation – both in 
manufacturing and services. The earlier urbanisation than in many other countries 




6.  Policy 
The focus in this survey is on the long run, thus I will not consider recent 
contributions to the debates about the role of policies during the depression of the 
1930s.
29 Nor, given the historical orientation adopted here, will I enter the debate 
concerning the effect of market liberalisation policies on growth and productivity 
performance since the 1980s. More generally, no recent study of the economic role of 
the state during the twentieth century has matched either the comprehensiveness or 
the historical sweep of that by Butlin, Barnard and Pincus (1982). However, there is 
one major area of policy that is closely linked to long-run growth, and that concerns 
the openness of the economy. 
Australian experience seems to offer something of a natural experiment on the 
relationship between trade policies and growth. A theme that is sometimes explicit, 
but often implicit, in Australian discussion of this issue is that the growth rate of the 
economy was reduced by the protectionist policies put in place after 1900, and thus to 
re-orient the economy to be more internationally competitive would raise the growth 
rate and hence per capita income levels.
30 I am not concerned here with the theoretical 
basis for this view. Rather, what is the evidence of the extent to which Australian 
growth was lowered as a result of pursuing for so long the (now) discredited policies 
on trade protection?  
                                                   
28  For a comparative assessment of historical urbanisation trends see Frost (1991). 
29  A useful collection can be found in Gregory and Butlin (1988).  
30   Anderson and Garnaut (1987, pp.16-17) explicitly link the growth in protection with Australia’s 
decline in income levels relative to other countries in the twentieth century.   
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The short answer is, there have been few rigorous attempts empirically to get a 
handle on the magnitude of these growth-reducing effects. Siriwardana (1996) has a 
shot at the impact of the tariff during the 1930s. However, estimates of the 
comparative static costs of protection do not by themselves indicate the long-run and 
dynamic growth effects in a world characterised by increasing returns, differentiated 
products, and changes over time in both transport costs and trade barriers in export 
markets.  
Not only is there a lack of evidence on the magnitude of the growth-retarding 
effects of the inward-oriented development strategy, there is a lack of clarity about the 
counterfactual, including the time period over which it is constructed. In the interwar 
years when world commodity markets were in retreat and international factor flows 
largely dried up, it might be that the impact on growth of rising protection were much 
less than over, say, a later two-decade period. In fact, the possibility that the 
relationship between tariff protection and growth has changed over the long run has 
been raised in recent comparative work, where Australia has been included in the 
sample of countries whose historical experience has been examined. O’Rourke (2000) 
has found a robust but positive relationship between tariffs and growth in the period 
1875 to 1914. Clemens and Williamson (2001) report confirmation of these results. 
But they also extend the analysis up to the present. They discover a negative and 
significant relationship for postwar years, confirming the accepted views relating to 
this period. For the interwar period the relationship is less clear-cut. The implications 
of this debate are important, raising the possibility that the growth-retarding impact of 
high protection in Australia was attenuated by other influences during certain periods 
of the twentieth century.  
 
7.  Deeper Determinants 
It is increasingly recognised by growth economists that limiting one’s focus to 
the proximate determinants will leave unexplained the key question of why some 
countries are rich and others poor. A similar conclusion applies to the Australian 
historical evidence. If we are to explain convincingly why Australia achieved living 
standards at least roughly comparable to those anywhere else soon after European 
settlement, and maintained this for 150 years, we need to do more than point to the 
growth of factor inputs and productivity. What accounts for the observed rates of 
domestic saving, foreign investment, and immigration? What lies behind measured  
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productivity growth? And why were policies either growth promoting or, if seriously 
growth inhibiting, modified or abandoned? Such questions take us directly to an 
examination of institutions, social attitudes, culture, and politics.  
Avoiding the resource curse.  One widely recognised influence on Australian 
growth has been the abundance of its resource base (Helliwell, 1984). However, many 
natural resource-rich economies have failed to sustain growth, whereas some 
resource-poor economies have succeeded. Resource abundance is thus neither 
necessary nor sufficient for long run growth.
31 Thus, a key question is what enabled 
Australia to convert its natural resource windfall into a basis for sustained growth.  
The answer to this question must lie in influences not traditionally 
incorporated in growth models – institutional arrangements, social values, and 
political decisions. For example, the terms and conditions of access to pastoral land 
(from the squatting era on) were crucial to the security of property rights and hence 
profitability of wool production.
32 Similarly, the reform of goldfields regulations and 
taxation arrangements that followed the Eureka stockade incident are an illustration of 
the growth-promoting redesign of institutional arrangements in the mining industry at 
a critical stage in its development (La Croix 1992). Again, the provision of 
agricultural research through the establishment of agricultural colleges and 
experimental farms in the nineteenth century and of the CSIRO in the twentieth 
century, institutions critical to the international competitiveness of Australian 
agriculture, are illustrations of public goods being supplied by the state where market 
forces alone would most likely have led to their under-supply (McLean 1982; 
Schedvin 1987). Thus the existence of abundant natural resources is not an 
explanation of Australian prosperity. It is their discovery, the rate of their 
exploitation, and the distribution of the resource rents, that leads to an impact on 
growth.   
                                                   
31  The prevailing view among empirical growth economists is that resource abundance is negatively 
related to growth – the seminal study being Sachs and Warner (1995). Australian experience (and that 
of some other economies) does not support this view: see Helliwell (1984), and McLean and Taylor 
(2003, pp.39-41). 
32  The 1847 New South Wales regulations governing pastoral land occupation that denied squatters 
freehold tenure, but instead awarded them fixed-term leases, may have been a pivotal decision with 
long-lasting political and social implications. It allowed the peaceful sub-division  (‘selection’) of vast 
areas of land from the 1860s to 1880s that created a more egalitarian distribution of land ownership, 
limiting in turn the political power of the pastoralists. The contrasting history of land disposal policies 
in Argentina, and of the political influence of large landowners there, is a salutary reminder of what 
might have been.  
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Of course, the extraction of non-renewable mineral resources, over-grazing of 
natural grasslands, soil erosion resulting from introduced livestock, and the increased 
salinity of river systems, are examples of the stock of natural capital being depleted in 
the course of obtaining high incomes for the inhabitants of this continent. What we 
await is a careful assessment of the extent to which past economic growth rates (and 
income levels) were achieved only by patterns of natural resource utilisation that 
maximised current rather than sustainable future consumption.    
Geography.  To the foreign observer some of the most striking aspects of the 
context within which the Australian economy operates are geographical. Australia is 
the same size as the continental United States but has a population equal only to that 
of Texas or New York. It is one of the few advanced economies having a significant 
proportion of its territory within the tropics. And though it lies at the southeast edge of 
Asia its economic links, until recently, were overwhelmingly with north-western 
Europe.  
Most Australian economists and many economic historians have taken these 
features for granted as not requiring explicit incorporation into structured stories of 
how the economy evolved and flourished. There have been exceptions. One of the 
reasons for the enduring interest in Geoffrey Blainey’s Tyranny of Distance (1966) is 
surely its thesis that aspects of geography are fundamental to Australian economic 
development. Also, recent interest in the environmental sustainability of economic 
activity stems in part from the growing appreciation of the importance of certain 
features of the Australian physical environment to our economic prosperity. Precisely 
because the motivation in some cases is to oppose further economic growth, even to 
advocate lower population levels (e.g., Flannery 1994), these authors use history to 
argue that the environmental limits to growth in this country were exceeded long ago. 
They thereby challenge (at least implicitly) the success story of growth as conveyed in 
mainstream accounts.  
Some writers in the empirical growth literature have elevated the importance 
assigned to geographical influences. Climatic conditions, access to the sea or 
navigable rivers, and distance from the centres of world trade and finance, have all 
been found to be significant determinants of growth in cross-country regressions.
33  
The relevance of such geographical considerations to an account of the sources of 
                                                   
33  See, for example, Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999). The role of geographical determinants in 
growth has, however, been contested by Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002).  
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Australia’s successful growth experience could draw on the traditional themes of its 
historians and historical geographers as well as insights from development 
economics.
34  In particular, it is likely that geography plays a prominent role in 
accounting for Australia’s extremely low population density.  
Institutions and colonial inheritance.  A further influence on the long-run 
growth performance of the Australian economy that receives little direct attention is 
the contribution of the institutional arrangements within which growth has occurred. 
This neglect seems due to the combination of the ease with which growth-enhancing 
institutions were created (most were imported), and due to the limited challenges that 
arose in adapting them to local or changing conditions. The institutional framework is 
seldom offered as a reason for our economic success because it is taken for granted. 
Yet many growth economists now believe that, perhaps more than any other factor, 
appropriate institutions are the key to explaining why some countries are rich and 
others poor (Acemoglu et al, 2002).  Thus, institutional arrangements in Australia 
seem to be a case of the dog that didn’t bark. At a time when failing institutions seem 
central to the problems of growth in many developing countries, the contribution of its 
institutional arrangements to the Australian success deserves more attention.  
However, there has been recognition of the importance of some institutions. 
The convict system is an example of a set of institutional arrangements that were 
fundamental to the early years of economic growth. Stephen Nicholas and his 
collaborators (Nicholas 1988) recently have placed on a much firmer basis the ways 
in which the convict labour market, and its interaction with the market for free (and 
emancipist) labour, worked flexibly to ensure the efficient allocation of workers. 
Furthermore, the selection in Britain of convicts for transportation appears to have 
been well attuned to the special labour requirements of a pioneer settlement. This all 
stands in some contrast to popular views that the convict system was a blight and 
burden on the establishment of solid foundations for a free and prosperous society.
35   
The institutional arrangements within which Australians had access to, and 
secure property rights in, land and minerals, has already been alluded to. For example, 
the family farm became the typical unit in rural settlement, ensuring (at least after the 
                                                   
34  McLean and Taylor (2003) raise these issues in the context of an historical comparison of growth in 
Australia and California.   
35  Other examples could be noted here: Khan (1999, 2000) on sources of improved legal efficiency in 
early rural NSW; and Ville’s (2000) account of the emergence and evolution of the stock and station 
agents and their industry – treated as an institutional innovation.  
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land acts of the 1860s and 1870s) a reasonably wide distribution of land ownership. 
This is similar to the pattern of public land disposal observed in the United States and 
Canada, but not in Argentina. The long-run economic consequences were probably 
momentous – influencing not just the distribution of wealth, but the concentration of 
political power, the timing of the widening of the political franchise, investment in 
public education, immigration policy, and even the evolution of financial market 
institutions.
36 The contrast between Argentina and Australia is especially telling here, 
given the likely importance of these differing initial institutional arrangements to the 
later divergence in growth rates between these two economies. 
Further, one may cite Australia’s colonial inheritance that, broadly speaking, 
endowed it with ready-made institutions derived from the world’s (then) most 
successful economy. Unlike Latin America or much of Africa and Asia, there has 
been no suggestion that growth performance over the last two centuries was 
significantly retarded by our colonial origins (Acemoglu et al, 2001). One may also 
note the transition to full independence (especially the federation of the Australian 
colonies in 1901) as institutional re-arrangements that did not have deleterious effects 
on growth in the long run, in contrast to the post-independence economic turmoil in 
many developing countries. In a comparative growth context, this is a significant 
Australian achievement.  
 Culture, ethnicity, and social norms.  There is no evidence that Australia 
encountered serious growth-inhibiting obstacles in any of the following: language, 
religion, legal system, ethnic diversity, political culture, or social norms. However, 
there is now strong evidence that, in some countries, one or more of these factors are 
(or were at some time in the past) crucial to the explanation for poor growth 
performance. Hence, an important part of the success story here is to account for our 
avoidance of these growth-retarding factors. Some of this was contingent – luck. This 
applies to the inheritance from Britain of language, legal system, and political 
institutions. Some of it may be home grown, including certain social norms. And it is, 
of course, more challenging to appraise the importance of an absent (but potentially 
negative) influence on growth. 
These observations reinforce how important it is for economic historians to 
stay in touch with developments in both the theoretical and empirical growth 
                                                   
36  These speculations are drawn from Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), and Engerman and Sokoloff  
(2003), who investigate the historical growth divergence of Anglo America and Latin America.  
  20 
literatures – as well as for economists to keep abreast of work in economic history. 
They also make the case for more attention to comparative historical analysis. The 
clearest illustration is offered by the small literature explaining the very different 
long-run growth experiences of Australia and Argentina.
37 In these writings the 
consensus is that it is precisely in the institutional arrangements, and in the political 
and cultural realms, that the deeper determinants are to be found for the striking 
divergence in the growth histories of these two countries despite what, on the surface, 
appeared very similar initial conditions, especially relating to their resource 
endowments and close integration with the international economy.   
 
8.   An interpretation   
It is possible to suggest an interpretation of the long-run growth story in 
Australia that builds on aspects of the traditional interpretations while taking account 
of insights from recent growth analysis. Space dictates that only the barest outlines 
can be sketched here.
38  
Australia’s (modern) economy was formed as part of the first globalisation, 
dating from the 1820s. Further, it was a settler economy – or European offshoot – 
where growth was at first primarily extensive in nature. As the natural resource base 
was discovered, the complementary factors of labour and capital were attracted in 
significant (if volatile) flows. The institutional framework for the economy was also 
imported, then adapted to local conditions, and proved to be predominantly growth 
enhancing. And the spatial pattern of development was heavily constrained by key 
features of the natural environment, including the location of fertile land, mineral 
deposits, and water supplies. The essential driver of this development was, at first, 
international demand for wool, gold, and other agricultural and mineral products. The 
combination of resource abundance (per capita) and strong foreign demand 
encouraged specialisation in production and ensured international competitiveness 
and hence high levels of productivity. This underpinned extraordinarily high per 
capita incomes from a very early stage.  
For how long these initial conditions persisted and continued to underpin 
growth (both extensive and intensive) is an important question. The severe depression 
of the 1890s does not seem to have fundamentally shifted the nature of the growth 
                                                   
37   See Duncan and Fogarty (1984), Dingle and Merrett (1985), and White (1992, Chapter 15).  
38  Some of the themes in what follows are also raised in McLean (2003).   
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process: reliance on rural development and commodity exports continues up to the 
first world war, and, despite quickening manufacturing development, resumes in the 
early 1920s. However, the view that the 1920s were the last phase of this century-long 
epoch of natural resource-based growth (Sinclair 1976) does not accord with the 
prominent role of the natural resource-based industries in the second long boom after 
1945. The post-war golden age has something of a nineteenth century feel about it: 
export booms in wool (Korean war), other agricultural products, and a range of 
minerals, together with a renewed surge in immigration and foreign investment.  
In a currently popular expression, Australia is described as having a 
commodity-based economy, the implication being that, in some respects, there has 
been no fundamental shift in its basis of growth despite dramatic changes in economic 
structure and organization since the nineteenth century. One illustration is the 
continuing dominance of primary products (agricultural, mineral, etc) in exports. An 
alternative illustration is the contributions to output growth of factor accumulation 
and total factor productivity. As previously described, there is no evidence of any 
dramatic change in the importance of the former between 1900 and 1979 (Kaspura 
and Weldon, 1980), implying that, at the earliest, such a shift might have begun only 
in the last decade or so (if then).   
This perspective can be given a comparative basis. The growth of the U.S., 
another settler economy, has been described in similar terms (Abramovitz and David 
2000). In the nineteenth century economic growth there, too, was primarily an 
extended process of factor accumulation, with the (measured) contribution from 
productivity gains being relatively less important. Immigration, the settlement of the 
west, and the integration of regional product and factor markets, underpinned both 
extensive growth and rising incomes. Around the end of the nineteenth and beginning 
of  the twentieth centuries, however, a fundamental shift occurred -  productivity 
improvement rather than factor accumulation became the principal source of 
American growth. Although natural resource abundance continued for several more 
decades to determine the products in which the U.S. had a comparative advantage, 
there occurred a transition to greater dependence on various types of knowledge 
creation. For example, the U.S. led the world in high school retention rates in the 
early twentieth century. Then, at the middle of the century, there occurred the 
dramatic rise of university education and of investment in scientific research in 
universities, corporations, and government research establishments. The transition  
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from its nineteenth century growth sources was by then complete. Australia’s lagged 
transition, in this comparative view, is a topic warranting further inquiry. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
  Some knowledge of Australian history is essential to an adequate 
understanding of why the economy is as it is. Also, there is relatively good evidence 
relating to the Australian growth record. And Australian experience is in some 
respects unusual, hence providing a natural experiment on issues such as the influence 
of geography versus institutions, the effects of colonialism or of tariff protection, the 
role of corruption, or the importance of social norms. Thus Australian historical 
experience is likely to attract more attention from economists.  
  What light Australia’s historical experience throws on the relative usefulness 
of neoclassical and endogenous growth models is a topic beyond this survey.
39 
However, the results of Kaspura and Weldon (1980) might be supportive of the view 
that ‘old’ growth theory, stressing factor accumulation, may have retained its 
relevance to this particular economy – at least until quite recently. But is this an 
exercise that tests the assumptions of a model rather than assisting the explanation of 
the historical record? For, as pointed out above, there are deeper questions, even about 
factor accumulation, concerning which neoclassical growth models offer little 
guidance. By contrast, the comparative approach, common to both economic 
historians and empirical growth economists, seems fruitful, especially when drawing 
on insights from growth models of any genre. Natural resource abundance appears to 
have been a blessing (as in the U.S.), rather than the curse portrayed in much of the 
growth literature. Human capital accumulation, by contrast, appears to have been 
rather less than in the U.S., but it is unclear how much this explains Australia’s poorer 
growth record in the first half of the twentieth century. Comparison with Argentina 
points to differences in access to foreign savings at certain times as favouring 
Australia – an insight from a traditional view of growth determinants.
40 However, the 
same comparison also suggests the importance of differences in the security of 
property rights, the distribution of access to land, and political stability in accounting 
for Australia’s superior growth record over the very long run – themes important in 
                                                   
39  Compare the comments on this same question as applied to U.S. and British historical experience by 
Romer (1996) and Crafts (1998), respectively.  
40  See, for example, the analysis in Taylor (1992).   
  23 
new growth theory. In a similar vein, comparisons with Canada might help answer 
different questions about Australian growth: for example, the role of geography – 
nearness to the U.S. market – in accounting for Canada’s earlier industrialisation; or 
its (arguably) better post-war growth record.   
  Finally, a comment about future contributions to the investigation of the 
Australian growth experience is perhaps apposite. Recent developments in theoretical 
and empirical growth economics have led to a renewed interest by economists in 
questions of long-standing concern to economic historians. Elsewhere this is 
rejuvenating co-operative research among specialists in macroeconomics, 
development economics and economic history. But it is unclear how far this will 
emerge in Australia, especially in light of the collapse in support for historical 
research in most of Australia’s leading economics departments. Scholars located 
overseas may thus come to play a more prominent role in the analysis of Australian 
long-run growth. This trend is already underway and evident in the many 
contributions by non-Australian economists to the writings on aspects of Australian 
economic history surveyed here.
41  
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Table 1. Australian Economic Growth 1828-2000 
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Panel B: Levels of Per Capita GDP 1820 - 1994 



















Sources: Panel A: 1820 - 1860, Butlin (1986, Table 8); 1861 - 1974 Maddock and 
McLean (1987, Table 1.1); 1974 - 2000, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 5204 
Australian System of National Accounts. Panel B: Maddison (1995, Appendix D). 
Years Real GDP Population
Real GDP 
Per Capita
1828 - 1840 13.2 10.4 2.6
1840 - 1850 8.7 7.8 0.8
1850 - 1860 12.8 10.9 1.8
1861 - 1889 4.8 3.5 1.3
1889 - 1905 0.8 1.7 -0.8
1905 - 1914 5.2 2.3 2.9
1914 - 1920 -1.6 1.3 -2.6
1920 - 1930 3.2 1.9 1.1
1930 - 1939 1.6 0.8 0.6
1939 - 1946 3.4 1.0 2.4
1946 - 1974 4.8 2.2 2.5
1974 - 2000 3.2 1.3 1.9
Year Australia U.K. Canada N.Z. Argentina
1820 119 136 69 n/a n/a
1850 169 130 70 n/a n/a
1870 155 133 66 127 53
1890 141 121 66 111 63
1900 105 113 67 105 67
1913 104 95 79 98 72
1929 74 76 69 77 63
1938 92 98 70 106 66
1950 75 72 74 89 52
1973 75 72 82 76 48
1994 76 73 81 67 37